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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JUAN RODRIGUEZ, JR. AKA
)
JOHNNY RODRIGUEZ,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NOS. 45013 & 45014
CANYON COUNTY NOS. CR 2016-15940
& CR 2016-18973
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In two separate cases, Juan Rodriguez, Jr., pleaded guilty to one count each of felony
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). In each case, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, to run concurrently with
each other. In this consolidated appeal, Mr. Rodriguez asserts the district court abused its
discretion when it imposed his sentences.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Officer Tucker of the Nampa Police Department saw a black car drive into a construction
zone, going around a road barricade stating, “road closed to through traffic.” (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)1 After confirming the car was not accessing a
residence or business in the closed zone, the officer initiated a traffic stop on the car. (PSI, p.3.)
Officer Tucker contacted the driver, identified by an Idaho temporary driver’s license as
Mr. Rodriguez. (PSI, p.3.) Officer Tucker smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming
from the car, and saw Mr. Rodriguez had glossy, bloodshot eyes. (PSI, p.3.) When questioned,
Mr. Rodriguez stated he had drank a beer and indicated the beer was in the passenger door
pocket. (PSI, p.3.) He then confirmed there was an open container in the car, and handed
Officer Tucker two mostly-full cans of hard lemonade. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Rodriguez failed the
administered field sobriety tests, and gave breath samples with results of .137 and .125. (PSI,
p.3.) He was transported to jail for driving under the influence and open container. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Rodriguez was later released on bond. (See R., p.19.)2
In Canyon County No. CR 2016-15940 (hereinafter, the first case), the State charged
Mr. Rodriguez by Information with one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol (second felony within 15 years), felony, I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005.
(R., pp.41-44.)
While Mr. Rodriguez was released on bond for the first case, he failed to appear at a
motions hearing, and the district court issued a bench warrant. (See R., pp.24, 32.) Two days
later, Officer Heitzman of the Nampa Police Department stopped a van for suspicion of DUI.

1

All citations to the PSI refer to the 46-page PDF version of the Presentence Report
and attachments.
2
All citations to R. refer to the 158-page PDF version of the Clerk’s Record.
2

(See PSI, p.3.) The officer had been sent to respond to an unwanted party at a residence, and the
reporting party stated a male had left the residence in a van and was intoxicated. (See PSI, p.3.)
While speaking with the reporting party, Officer Heitzman saw a van whose driver matched the
description of the male, and asked the driver to stop. (PSI, p.3.) Officer Heitzman smelled a
strong order of an alcoholic beverage coming from the van, and noticed the driver had glassy,
bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. (PSI, p.3.) The driver identified himself as Mr. Rodriguez.
(PSI, p.3.) Mr. Rodriguez admitted to consuming alcohol prior to driving. (PSI, pp.3-4.) He
failed the administered field sobriety tests, and provided three breath samples with results of
.275, .254, and .250. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Rodriguez was transported to jail and booked for driving
under the influence, driving without privileges, and open container. (PSI, p.4.)
In Canyon County No. CR 2016-18973 (hereinafter, the second case), the State charged
Mr. Rodriguez by Information with one count of felony operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol (second felony within 15 years), one count of driving without privileges,
misdemeanor, I.C. § 18-8001, and one count of “liquor open container (driver),” misdemeanor,
I.C. § 23-505(2). (R., pp.93-97.)
Mr. Rodriguez initially entered not guilty pleas in both cases.

(See R., pp.98-99.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Rodriguez later agreed to plead guilty to the DUI charges in
both cases. (See Tr. Dec. 28, 2016, p.1, L.18 – p.2, L.2.) The State agreed to dismiss the two
misdemeanors in the second case, and to not pursue a persistent violator sentencing enhancement
in either case. (See Tr. Dec. 28, 2016, p.1, L.23 – p.3, L.11.) Sentencing recommendations
would be open. (Tr. Dec. 28, 2016, p.2, L.2.) The district court accepted Mr. Rodriguez’s pleas
of guilty in both cases. (Tr. Dec. 28, 2016, p.24, L.22 – p.25, L.10.)
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Mr. Rodriguez’s PSI recommended he participate in the Canyon County Veterans
Treatment Court (Veterans Court) and be placed on probation. (See PSI, pp.14-15; Tr. Feb. 22,
2017, p.21, Ls.24-25.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated it had received notice
from Veterans Court that the State had exercised its authority to veto Mr. Rodriguez’s
participation as an initial term of his probation, but he might be accepted following a period of
retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.15, Ls.11-22.)
The State recommended the district court impose a unified sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed, in the first case, and a consecutive unified sentence of five years indeterminate
in the second case. (Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.21, L.18 – p.22, L.14.) Mr. Rodriguez told the district
court he was willing to participate in and successfully complete Veterans Court. (Tr. Feb. 22,
2017, p.25, Ls.21-22.) If that were not an option, Mr. Rodriguez asked the district court to
consider retaining jurisdiction, with an underlying unified sentence of ten years, with two years
fixed, in each case, to run concurrently with each other. (See Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.25, L.23 –
p.26, L.16.)
In each case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two years
fixed, to run concurrently with each other. (R., pp.63-64, 131-32.) When explaining why it
would not retain jurisdiction, the district court noted, “this is his third excessive DUI and that he
committed the fourth DUI offense while he was bonded out and pending the third DUI offense,
both of which are more aggravating, in my estimation.” (See Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.32, Ls.16-25.)
The district court also stated the fact that Mr. Rodriguez had previously completed a problemsolving court, but not continued his rehabilitation or sobriety, was “aggravating in the sense that
the Court is not convinced that the problem-solving courts will adequately address his needs and
protect society at the same time.” (Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.33, Ls.3-15.)
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In each case, Mr. Rodriguez filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s
Judgment and Commitment. (R., pp.65-68, 133-36.) The Idaho Supreme Court consolidated the
two appeals. (Nos. 45013 & 45014, Order to Consolidate Appeals for All Purposes, Apr. 24,
2017.)
Mr. Rodriguez also filed, in each case, a Motion and Memorandum in Support of Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence. (See R., pp.144-52.) Mr. Rodriguez
asserted the State had violated the terms of the plea agreement and exceeded its authority by
vetoing his participation in Veterans Court. (See R., pp.148-51.) The district court denied
Mr. Rodriguez’s Rule 35 motions, on the basis the district court would not have placed him on
probation with Veterans Court, even absent the State’s veto. (Nos. CR 2016-15940 & CR 201618973, Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, July 20, 2017.)3
On appeal, Mr. Rodriguez does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motions.4

3

The Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 is the subject of a
Motion to Augment, filed contemporaneously with this brief.
4
The district court observed, “even though the court agrees that the terms of the plea agreement
were likely violated, and that the prosecutorial veto exercised in this case likely violated the rule
announced in [State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214 (2014)], it isn’t clear to the court that a reduced
sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 is [an] appropriate remedy or is warranted in these cases.” (Order
Denying Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.9.) The district court further
stated, “no new information has been presented in support of the defendant’s motion.” (Order
Denying Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.9.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman,
144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a
vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.” Id.
5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed two concurrent unified sentences of
ten years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Rodriguez following his pleas of guilty to felony
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Two Concurrent Unified Sentences
Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Rodriguez Following His Pleas Of Guilty To
Felony Operating A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of Alcohol
Mr. Rodriguez asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his
concurrent unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, because his sentences are
excessive considering any view of the facts. The district court should have instead followed
Mr. Rodriguez’s recommendation by retaining jurisdiction with the same underlying sentences.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving “due regard
to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Rodriguez does not assert that his sentences exceed the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in
order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Rodriguez must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing
criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing.

Id.

An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a
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sentence . . . consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726
(2007). The reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant’s probable term of confinement.” Id.
Mr. Rodriguez asserts his sentences are excessive considering any view of the facts,
because the district court did not adequately consider mitigating factors. Specifically, the district
court did not adequately consider Mr. Rodriguez’s military service. While the district court
characterized Mr. Rodriguez’s military service as a “significant mitigating factor[],” (see
Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.28, L.24 – p.29, L.2), Mr. Rodriguez submits the district court did not go far
enough in considering his time in the military. Mr. Rodriguez served with the United States
Marine Corps from 2005 to 2012. (See PSI, pp.9-10.) He was deployed to Iraq in 2008. (PSI,
p.10.) Mr. Rodriguez was honorably discharged in 2012 at the rank of E-3. (PSI, p.10.) The
Canyon County Veteran’s Justice Outreach Officer reported Mr. Rodriguez was 70% service
connected for PTSD and “other conditions.”

(PSI, p.10.)

At the sentencing hearing,

Mr. Rodriguez’s counsel stated, “I think that’s significant. And I’m sure that affects his life
quite a bit.” (Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.24, Ls.5-7.)
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Rodriguez’s mental condition. A
district court must consider evidence of a defendant’s mental condition offered at the time of
sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2523(1). Here, the district court recognized Mr. Rodriguez suffered
from PTSD as a result of his military service, and described that as another significant mitigating
factor. (See Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.28, L.24 – p.29, L.4.) However, Mr. Rodriguez submits the
district court did not adequately consider the full scope of his mental health issues. The GAIN-I
Recommendation and Referral Summary (GRRS) for Mr. Rodriguez contains rule out diagnoses
for both “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” and “Acute Stress Disorder or other disorder of extreme
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stress – Provisional.” (PSI, pp.25-26.) He “scored in the moderate range of the Internal Mental
Distress Scale” and “self-reported symptoms indicating the possible existence of a stress
disorder.” (PSI, p.26.) While Mr. Rodriguez stated during the presentence investigation he did
not see his PTSD as much of a problem and did not feel he was in need of counseling, he also
reported he had been hospitalized at the West Valley Behavioral Health Center in 2009 and
2015. (See PSI, p.11.) The presentence report stated Mr. Rodriguez “is not only suffering from
the effects of alcoholism, but he has a mental health component as well due to PTSD. It is
unlikely his alcoholism would be resolved without treatment of his PTSD as well.” (PSI, p.14.)
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Rodriguez’s substance
abuse problems. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized substance abuse as a mitigating
factor in cases where it found a sentence to be excessive. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,
91 (1982). Mr. Rodriguez reported he started drinking at the age of fourteen, and began drinking
heavily at the age of twenty-one when he had trouble adjusting from heavy combat to leave.
(PSI, p.11.) After Mr. Rodriguez ended his active duty and returned home from Iraq, he drank
heavily on a daily basis before his arrest for felony DUI in 2009. (See PSI, p.11.) Mr. Rodriguez
stated he gave up drinking completely after that offense, finished drug court with no problems,
and remained sober for six years. (See PSI, p.11.) He began drinking again after he and his wife
separated in 2015. (PSI, p.11.)
The GRRS stated Mr. Rodriguez “reported that he has quit using substances and is about
100% to remain abstinent.” (PSI, p.31.) The presentence investigator wrote that Veterans Court
staff had determined Mr. Rodriguez “would be appropriate for the Veteran’s Court program and
would benefit from the intensive treatment and structure offered by the program, to address his
underlying PTSD and substance abuse and hold him accountable for bad decisions he may make
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in the future.” (PSI, pp.14-15.) However, the State vetoed Mr. Rodriguez’s participation in
Veterans Court as an initial term of his probation. (See Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.15, Ls.11-22.)
Further, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Rodriguez’s work ethic and
family support. Mr. Rodriguez worked as a trailer technician at Rush Truck Centers of Idaho
from September 2013 until his arrest. (PSI, p.10.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Rodriguez’s
counsel told the district court that while Mr. Rodriguez “can’t be a truck driver anymore,” he
“was able to secure employment at MGM Welding here in Caldwell.” (Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.25,
Ls.13-15.) The GRRS stated that Mr. Rodriguez wanted to move to Texas with his brother to
work on oil rigs. (PSI, p.24.) Counsel also informed the district court, “[h]e does have a place to
reside here in the community with his mom, who is supportive of him.” (Tr. Feb. 22, 2017, p.25,
Ls.15-17.) The GRRS stated that while Mr. Rodriguez professed he dealt with his problems
alone, he also reported his fiancée and older brother were supportive of him. (PSI, p.33.)
The district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating factors.

Thus,

Mr. Rodriguez asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his concurrent
unified sentences, because his sentences are excessive considering any view of the facts. The
district court should have instead followed Mr. Rodriguez’s recommendation by retaining
jurisdiction with the same underlying sentences.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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